| Demosthenes, Speeches (English) (XML Header) [genre: prose; rhetoric] [word count] [lemma count] [Dem.]. | ||
| <<Dem. 39.1 | Dem. 39.10 (Greek) | >>Dem. 39.19 |
39.7To begin with (assuming that it is best to mention public matters before private), in what way will the state give its command to us, if any duty is to be performed? The members of the tribe will, of course note, nominate us in the same way as they nominate other people. Well then; they will bring forward the name of Mantitheus, son of Mantias, of Thoricus note if they are nominating one for choregus note or gymnasiarch note or feaster of the tribe note or for any other office. By what, then, will it be made clear whether they are nominating you or me?
39.8You will say it is I; I shall say it is you. note Well, suppose that after this the Archon summons us, or any other magistrate, before whom the case is called. We do not obey the summons; we do not undertake the service. Which of us is liable to the penalties provided by law? And in what manner will the generals enter our names, if they are listing names for a tax-company? or if they are appointing a trierarch? Or, if there be a military expedition, how will it be made clear which of us is on the muster-roll?
39.9Or again, if any other magistrate, the Archon, the King-Archon, the Stewards of the Games, makes an appointment for some public service, what sign will there be to indicate which one of us they are appointing? Are they in heaven's name to add the designation “son of Plangon,'' if they are entering your name, or add the name of my mother if they are entering mine? But who ever heard of such a thing? or by what law could this special designation be appended, or anything else, accept the name of the father and the deme? And seeing that both of these are the same great confusion must result.
39.10Again, suppose Mantitheus, son of Mantias, of Thoricus should be summoned as judge, note what should we do? Should we go, both of us? For how is it to be clear whether he has summoned you or me? Or, by Zeus, suppose the state is appointing to any office by lot, for example that of Senator, note that of Thesmothet, note or any of the rest; how will it be clear which one of us has been appointed?—unless some mark shall be attached to the tablet, note as there might be to anything else; and even then people will not know to which of us two it belongs. Well then, he will say that he has been appointed, and I shall say that I have.
39.11The only course left is for us to go into court. So the city will order a court to be set up for each of the cases; and we shall be cheated of the fair and equal right, that the one chosen by lot shall hold office. Then we shall berate each other, and he who shall prevail by his words will hold office. And in which case should we be better off—by trying to rid ourselves of our existing resentments, or by arousing fresh animosities and recriminations? For these must of necessity result, when we wrangle with one another about an office or anything else.
39.12But suppose again (for we must examine every phase of the matter), one or the other of us persuades the other, in case he is chosen, to yield the office to him, and so obtains the appointment? What is this but one man drawing lots with two tablets? Shall it, then, be permitted us to do with impunity a thing for which the law appoints the penalty of death? “Why, certainly, for we should not do it,” you may say. I know that, at least so far as I am concerned; but it is not right that some persons should even be liable to this penalty, when they need not be.
39.13Very well; but in these cases it is the state that is injured: what harm does it do me individually? Observe in what serious ways I am harmed, and consider if there be anything in what I say. Indeed the wrong done to me is far more grievous than what you have heard. You all know, for instance, that he was intimate with Menecles during his lifetime, and with his crowd, and that he now associates with others no better than Menecles, and that he has cherished the same ambitions, and desires to be thought a clever fellow note; and, by Zeus, I dare say he is. 39.14Now, if, as time goes on, he undertakes to set on foot any of the same practices as these men (these are indictments, presentments for contraband, informations, arrests) and on the basis of one of these he is condemned to pay a fine to the state (for there are many vicissitudes in mortal affairs, and you know well how to keep in due bounds even the most clever people on any occasion when they overreach themselves), why will his name be entered on the record any more than mine? 39.15“Because,” it may be said, “everybody will know which of us two was fined.” Very good; but suppose (what might very well happen) that time passes and the debt is not paid; why is there any greater likelihood that the defendant's children will be entered on the list of state debtors any more than my own when the name of the father and the tribe, and all else are identical? Suppose, now, somebody should bring a suit for ejectment against him, and should state that he had nothing to do with me, but, having had the writ registered, should enter the name, why will the name he has entered be that of my opponent any more than my own? What if he fails to pay any of the property-taxes?
| Demosthenes, Speeches (English) (XML Header) [genre: prose; rhetoric] [word count] [lemma count] [Dem.]. | ||
| <<Dem. 39.1 | Dem. 39.10 (Greek) | >>Dem. 39.19 |
